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529 
DEMOCRATIC COMPETENCE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DISORDER, AND THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
Stephen I. Vladeck* 
Abstract: In Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First Amendment 
Jurisprudence for the Modern State, Robert Post offers a powerful argument for why the 
First Amendment should protect the manner in which professional disciplines produce expert 
speech. This symposium Essay responds to Post’s book by focusing on the potential 
interaction between Post’s theory of “democratic competence” and the freedom of the press. 
Using the WikiLeaks affair as a foil, this Essay concludes that a “democratic competence” 
approach might provide a more coherent theoretical underpinning for according 
constitutional protection to newsgathering (as distinct from publication), and might thereby 
help to answer the unanswerable question about what the First Amendment’s Press Clause 
actually protects. By the same logic, though, it might also provide for greater restraint on the 
media insofar as it constitutionalizes conventional arguments about the need to honor the 
government’s expertise when protecting national security secrets against public 
dissemination. Thus, the question Post really raises is whether such a deeper but narrower 
First Amendment is one to which we should aspire. 
 
We have then, at least in my opinion, the worst of both worlds. 
On the one hand the laws stand idle and are not enforced at least 
in part because their meaning is so obscure, and on the other 
hand it is likely that the very obscurity of these laws serves to 
deter perfectly legitimate expression and debate by persons who 
must be as unsure of their liabilities as I am unsure of their 
obligations.1 
* * * 
[G]overnment may guard mightily against serious but more 
ordinary leaks, and yet must suffer them if they occur. Members 
of Congress as well as the press may publish materials that the 
                                                     
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Scholarship, American University Washington College 
of Law. My thanks to Ron Collins for inviting me to participate in this symposium, to Robert Post 
for providing such enriching material, to Pasha Sternberg for superlative research assistance, and to 
Rebecca Levine and the staff of the Washington Law Review for their diligence and patience. The 
author retains the copyright in this article and authorizes royalty-free reproduction for non-profit 
purposes, provided any such reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the Washington 
Law Review. 
1. Espionage Laws and Leaks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the Permanent 
H. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. 14 (1979) (statement of Anthony A. Lapham, Gen. 
Counsel, CIA). 
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government wishes to, and is entitled to, keep private. It is a 
disorderly situation surely. But if we ordered it we would have 
to sacrifice one of two contending values—privacy or public 
discourse—which are ultimately irreconcilable.2 
 
When the international organization WikiLeaks systematically 
disclosed to the public massive volumes of classified U.S. government 
information—including scores of sensitive diplomatic cables3—by 
posting them to its eponymous website, it presented a conundrum for 
those attempting to expound a comprehensive (and coherent) theory of 
the First Amendment.4 To understand the parameters of the problem, 
consider 18 U.S.C. § 793(e), part of the Espionage Act of 1917.5 Section 
793(e) makes it a crime for anyone “having unauthorized possession 
of . . . information relating to the national defense which information the 
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United 
States or to the advantage of any foreign nation,” to “willfully 
communicate[] . . . the same to any person not entitled to receive it,” or 
to “willfully retain[] the same and fail[] to deliver it to the officer or 
employee of the United States entitled to receive it.”6 Assume for the 
sake of argument that the U.S. government could make out a prima facie 
case that Julian Assange, WikiLeaks’ enigmatic founder and editor-in-
chief, violated § 793(e) by posting to public websites thousands of 
classified U.S. government diplomatic cables and reports (at least some 
of which presumably “relat[e] to the national defense”).7 Would the First 
Amendment ever provide Assange with a defense?8 I have suggested 
                                                     
2. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975). 
3. For an overview of the WikiLeaks affair, see THE NEW YORK TIMES, OPEN SECRETS: 
WIKILEAKS, WAR, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (Alexander Star ed., 2011). 
4. See Peter Grier, WikiLeaks: Would First Amendment Protect Julian Assange?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1203/WikiLeaks-Would-First-
Amendment-protect-Julian-Assange.  
5. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22 
& 50 U.S.C.). 
6. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2006). 
7. Perhaps because of First Amendment concerns, at least one district court has read an additional 
scienter requirement into § 793(e). See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 645 (E.D. Va. 
2006). I assume here that, to the extent Rosen is followed, the government could satisfy such a 
heightened burden in Assange’s case. Obviously, there would be no need to reach the First 
Amendment question if the statute itself did not apply. 
8. Some have argued that the First Amendment ought not to protect Assange because he is a non-
citizen whose allegedly unlawful conduct took place outside the territorial United States. See, e.g., 
Andrew C. McCarthy, How to Get Julian Assange, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 12, 2010), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/julian-assange-u-s-aggressive-prosecution-charge-wikileaks-
villain-article-1.474728. Whether or not someone in Assange’s situation could affirmatively invoke 
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elsewhere that the answer under extant precedent is quite possibly “no.”9 
Now, change the hypothetical: What if the government separately 
sought to prosecute the New York Times, which published a number of 
articles quoting directly from some of the classified documents that 
WikiLeaks made public, and also posted some of the cables 
themselves?10 Assuming that, per its text, § 793(e) applies to 
downstream redistribution,11 would the Times have a First Amendment 
defense to such charges?12 And what about individuals who downloaded 
some of the WikiLeaks documents onto their computers, or who 
downloaded the Times articles quoting from those documents, and 
“willfully retain[ed] the same”? Would they have a First Amendment 
defense? In general, if one believes that the answer to the First 
Amendment question in each of these three scenarios isn’t the same, 
what is the First Amendment principle that supplies the necessary basis 
for distinguishing among them? 
At first blush, it may not be obvious how these questions relate to 
academic freedom, or to Robert Post’s discussion thereof in Democracy, 
Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First Amendment Jurisprudence 
for the Modern State.13 Indeed, other than one tantalizing allusion,14 
                                                     
the First Amendment as a civil plaintiff, allowing him to raise it as a defense to a criminal 
prosecution by the U.S. government in an Article III federal court seems a far less debatable 
proposition. 
9. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework 
and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 232–34 (2007). 
10. See, e.g., Scott Shane, WikiLeaks Leaves Names of Diplomatic Sources in Cables, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011, at A4; Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at 
U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1. 
11. There is no textual reason why § 793(e) wouldn’t apply to any and all retransmissions of the 
same information, even once that information is already otherwise available in the public domain. 
Nevertheless, there has only been one attempted prosecution of a third party under § 793(e), and 
that attempt collapsed. See Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602; Feds Drop Charges in AIPAC Spy Case, 
CBSNEWS (May 1, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-250_162-4982793.html.  
12. In the Pentagon Papers case, Justice White expressly suggested that the Times and 
Washington Post could have been prosecuted under § 793(e) after publishing the Pentagon Papers. 
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 737–40 (1971) (White, J., concurring). 
13. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012). 
14. Consider the following passage: 
First Amendment coverage presumptively extends to media for the communication of 
ideas, like newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or cinema, which are the primary 
vehicles for the circulation of the texts that define and sustain the public sphere. In the 
absence of strong countervailing reasons, whatever is said within such media is covered 
by the First Amendment. 
Id. at 20 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Obviously, one wonders what Post has in mind as 
examples of “strong countervailing reasons.” The monograph provides no further illumination. 
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nowhere does Post’s monograph grapple at all with the question of 
whether (or when) the government’s interest in protecting national 
security secrets would justify infringement on otherwise constitutionally 
protected speech qua publication.15 Instead, Post’s book focuses on the 
complex relationship between two First Amendment values: democratic 
legitimation, which he defines as the commitment “to the egalitarian 
premise that every person is entitled to communicate his own opinion,”16 
and democratic competence—“the cognitive empowerment of persons 
within public discourse, which in part depends on their access to 
disciplinary knowledge.”17 Democratic competence, Post explains, is 
necessary for democratic legitimation, even though it is inconsistent with 
it to the extent that democratic competence requires certain speech to 
“be subject to a disciplinary authority that distinguishes good ideas from 
bad ones.”18 As he elaborates, “[t]he value of democratic competence is 
undermined whenever the state acts to interrupt the communication of 
disciplinary knowledge that might inform the creation of public 
opinion.”19 As such, the First Amendment itself must privilege—and 
protect from governmental interference—the means by which the 
relevant discipline creates expert knowledge in order properly to protect 
the integrity (the “competence”) of public discourse.20 
Post’s central (“radical and counterintuitive”21) conclusion, that 
“democratic competence can be constitutionally protected only if the 
disciplinary practices that create expert knowledge are themselves 
invested with constitutional status,”22 is provocative and insightful. It 
also has implications far afield of academic freedom, for it suggests a 
way of fundamentally reconceptualizing not just the underlying purpose 
of the First Amendment, but a host of distinctions in First Amendment 
jurisprudence that have typically defied easy theoretical grounding.23 
                                                     
15. Nor does Post’s prior work (including his student note, which criticized Congress’s failure to 
define the term “national security” in FOIA, see Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom 
of Information Act, 85 YALE L.J. 401 (1976)) shed light on his views as to the circumstances in 
which government can suppress (or retroactively punish) publication of sensitive information 
without running afoul of the First Amendment.  
16. POST, supra note 13, at xiii. 
17. Id. at 34. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 61. 
20. See id. at 95–99. 
21. Id. at 96. 
22. Id. 
23. In addition to academic freedom, Post devotes a fair amount of discussion in the book (and in 
his earlier work) to making sense of the Court’s approach to “commercial” speech. See, e.g., id. at 
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Indeed, it is probably no understatement to suggest that it will take years 
to fully flesh out the implications of Post’s thesis in areas besides and 
beyond academic freedom. 
At least where national security and the press are concerned, though, 
the implications of Post’s thesis are both immediate and potentially 
dramatic. Thus, using the WikiLeaks affair as a foil, this Essay situates 
Post’s “democratic competence” theory within the larger—and ever-
ongoing—debate over the extent to which the First Amendment protects 
the freedom of the press, especially in situations where the government 
may have a compelling interest in keeping particular information 
secret.24 There are at least two potential consequences that would result 
from applying Post’s theory in this context: First, as Part I explains, 
“democratic competence” could well provide the missing theoretical 
justification for reinvigorating the First Amendment’s Press Clause25—a 
provision that the U.S. Supreme Court, for various reasons, has 
consistently declined to invest with substantive content independent of 
its immediate lexical predecessor, the First Amendment’s Speech 
Clause.26 To the extent that journalism as a discipline would qualify for 
the special protections attendant to Post’s democratic competence 
approach,27 his book may finally provide the hook on which courts and 
commentators can hang a constitutional distinction between Julian 
Assange and the New York Times, as opposed to merely an emotional 
one.28 
                                                     
34–46; Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000). 
But see Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: 
The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1303, 1334–36 (2009) (describing and critiquing application of Post’s theory to commercial 
speech). 
24. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 185 (2007) (summarizing the theoretical, doctrinal, and prudential considerations that 
factor into properly framing the balance between governmental secrecy and freedom of the press). 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press . . . .”). 
26. See generally David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429 (2002); 
Margaret A. Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP. CT. 
REV. 225; Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011).  
27. This result would depend, in Post’s view, on the creation of a “constitutional sociology of 
knowledge” pursuant to which standardized conditions for expertise are “created and certified.” 
POST, supra note 13, at 58. The example Post uses is if Congress were to require accountants to use 
“predetermined federal formulae for the calculation of profit.” As Post explains, First Amendment 
coverage “would be triggered if the mandated federal formulae either prevented accountants from 
distributing knowledge or required accountants to distribute falsehoods.” Id. 
28. For examples of the latter, see Floyd Abrams, Op-Ed., Why WikiLeaks Is Unlike the Pentagon 
Papers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2010, at A13, and Bill Keller, The Boy Who Kicked the Hornet’s 
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Second, and cutting somewhat in the opposite direction for reasons 
elaborated upon in Part II, “democratic competence” might also have a 
downside with regard to freedom of the press, at least where national 
security secrets are concerned. After all, if one can fairly describe Post’s 
book as arguing that there are contexts in which the Constitution should 
privilege “disciplinary knowledge” over amateur opinion, it is not 
difficult to imagine government arguments that government officials, 
rather than journalists, possess the relevant disciplinary knowledge when 
it comes to disseminating national security secrets.29 Journalists, after 
all, are only (highly skilled) amateurs in terms of assessing the nature of 
threats to U.S. national security. Consequently, just as Post’s theory 
would embolden the discipline of journalism, so too might it entrench 
the discipline of governmental secrecy, in which the relevant experts 
may all argue against publishing, among other things, the torture 
memos,30 the warrantless wiretapping program,31 black sites,32 and so on. 
Post might respond that this conceptualization does not apply when it 
comes to using disciplinary expertise to keep information out of public 
discourse, but it is not immediately obvious why democratic competence 
is only a one-way ratchet. Put another way, in areas where suitable 
indicia of expertise were available, might not Post’s approach provide 
just as convincing arguments for withholding information from public 
discourse?33 
                                                     
Nest, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011, § MM (Magazine) at 32. 
29. Indeed, this argument is a variation on the more general argument against judicial 
interference in national security policy, i.e., that the executive branch possesses the relevant 
expertise when it comes to deciding which information can and cannot be publicly disclosed. See 
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE 
COURTS (2007). But see Alice Ristroph, Professors Strangelove, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 245 (2008) 
(reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra). 
30. See Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture: Justice 
Dept. Gave Advice in 2002, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23373-2004Jun7.html (summarizing memos 
produced by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel that appeared to condone the torture 
of non-citizens in U.S. custody). 
31. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1 (discussing classified program of potentially unlawful domestic 
wiretapping). 
32. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons: Debate Is Growing Within 
Agency About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 
2005, at A1 (disclosing CIA practice of sending suspected terrorists to secret prisons in foreign 
countries based on classified documents leaked to reporter by government sources). 
33. See, e.g., Redish & Mollen, supra note 23, at 1339 (“[T]he democratic competence model 
seemingly assumes that government can identify ‘false’ speech and properly suppress it. Allowing 
the government to regulate speech in this manner deprives individuals of the very information that 
might reasonably cause them to question orthodox ideas of truth and to challenge those in authority 
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More generally, as this Essay concludes, the WikiLeaks example 
reveals the dilemma that democratic competence would truly pose for 
the First Amendment. Democratic competence may expand the scope of 
First Amendment protection, but it might also empower the government 
(and perhaps other disciplinary practices) with stronger countervailing 
arguments justifying the suppression of speech in cases in which the 
First Amendment would otherwise apply, or privileging other classes of 
speech over those classes Post has in mind. If that’s true, the question 
becomes whether we really should aspire to such a deeper but potentially 
narrower First Amendment. 
I.  “DEMOCRATIC COMPETENCE” WOULD REINVIGORATE 
THE PRESS CLAUSE AS AN INDEPENDENT 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINT 
Despite the familiar admonition that “it cannot be presumed that any 
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect,”34 the U.S. 
Supreme Court has never identified substantive rights protected by the 
First Amendment’s Press Clause independent of those guaranteed by the 
previous clause’s protection of the “freedom of speech.”35 As Justice 
Kennedy explained in Citizens United36: 
We have consistently rejected the proposition that the 
institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of 
other speakers. With the advent of the Internet and the decline of 
print and broadcast media, moreover, the line between the media 
and others who wish to comment on political and social issues 
becomes far more blurred.37 
To be sure, the Court’s reluctance may in part be based on textual 
uncertainty, given the debate over whether the “press” the First 
Amendment meant to protect is an industry, a technology, or something 
else entirely.38 But even for those who believe that the Framers meant to 
protect the press in whatever form as a means for publicly disseminating 
                                                     
who hold such ideas.”). 
34. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
35. See sources cited supra note 26. 
36. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
37. Id. at 905–06 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
38. Compare, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a 
Technology?: From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 459 (2012) (arguing that, based on 
historical sources, the Press Clause is better understood as protecting the press as a technology), 
with Randall P. Bezanson, Whither Freedom of the Press?, 97 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(criticizing Volokh’s analysis).  
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matters of public concern, it remains difficult to discern just who the 
Constitution intends to protect in the provision of that service.39 This 
task is particularly challenging since, as Justice Kennedy observed, 
technological innovations have increasingly blurred any possible 
distinction between professional and amateur newsgatherers.40 Of 
course, the celebrated First Amendment advocate Floyd Abrams may be 
correct that, “[i]n the great preponderance of cases, a court has little 
difficulty knowing a journalist when it sees one.”41 But, as is true with so 
many doctrines, it is the marginal cases that matter—and that invariably 
make bad law. To that end, this Part begins by offering an overview of 
the competing viewpoints with regard to the constitutional status of the 
press before turning to Post’s “democratic competence” theory and how 
its application to journalism might solve some of the open questions in 
this area. 
A.  The U.S. Supreme Court and the Press 
Although there are numerous academic overviews of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in cases implicating the press, perhaps 
Justice Potter Stewart, in a famous 1974 speech he delivered at Yale 
Law School, provided the most concise capsule summary.42 Stewart’s 
view was that the Press Clause is a structural provision designed to 
protect the “institutional autonomy” of the press, and that the Court’s 
jurisprudence has largely struck the right balance in promoting and 
preserving that autonomy: 
So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may 
publish what it knows, and may seek to learn what it can. 
But this autonomy cuts both ways. The press is free to do 
battle against secrecy and deception in government. But the 
press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee that it 
will succeed. There is no constitutional right to have access to 
particular government information, or to require openness from 
                                                     
39. See, e.g., West, supra note 26, at 1029. 
40. I don’t mean to suggest that the line-drawing problem is of recent vintage. On the contrary, 
the difficulty of separating the “press” from the lay public has been inherent since the First 
Amendment was ratified. See Anderson, supra note 26, at 446–51. At a minimum, though, it seems 
clear that technological advances have made it that much cheaper for private citizens to engage in 
mass public communication, and have thereby eliminated the economic barriers to entry that might 
previously have served as a practical limit on the public at large. 
41. Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous 
Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 580 (1979). 
42. See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). 
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the bureaucracy. The public’s interest in knowing about its 
government is protected by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the 
protection is indirect.43 
Thus, although largely through the Free Speech Clause (or through 
unspecific allusions to the First Amendment in general), the Court has 
applied the most rigid scrutiny to decisions regarding newsworthiness; 
divided rather pointedly on the question of punishment subsequent to 
publication; and generally left undisturbed state and federal laws 
interfering with acts of newsgathering.44 Accordingly, the Court has 
struck down state laws (1) requiring a newspaper to provide equal space 
to a candidate whose character the paper had assailed;45 (2) banning 
newspapers from publishing accounts of confessions or admissions made 
by criminal defendants to law enforcement or other non-media third 
parties;46 and (3) punishing third parties for “divulging or publishing 
truthful information regarding confidential proceedings” of a state 
judicial inquiry and review commission.47 At the same time, the Court 
has refused to formally recognize a “reporter’s privilege” shielding 
journalists from complying with state or federal grand jury subpoenas, 
even while recognizing that “without some protection for seeking out the 
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”48 As Justice White’s 
opinion in Branzburg concluded: 
It would be frivolous to assert—and no one does in these 
cases—that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing 
news or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter or his 
news sources to violate valid criminal laws. Although stealing 
documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy 
information, neither reporter nor source is immune from 
conviction for such conduct, whatever the impact on the flow of 
news.49 
The Court’s most recent foray into this field manifests precisely this 
distinction. Bartnicki v. Vopper50 upheld a radio station’s “repeated 
                                                     
43. Id. at 636. 
44. Abrams, supra note 41, at 587 (footnotes omitted). 
45. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
46. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
47. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978). 
48. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).  
49. Id. at 691; see also Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 419–20 (1918) (“It 
suffices to say that however complete is the right of the press to state public things and discuss 
them, that right as every other right enjoyed in human society is subject to the restraints which 
separate right from wrongdoing.”). 
50. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
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intentional disclosure of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone 
conversation about a public issue. The persons who made the disclosures 
did not participate in the interception, but they did know—or at least had 
reason to know—that the interception was unlawful.”51 Writing for a 6–3 
majority, Justice John Paul Stevens relied on three critical facts: that the 
radio station itself had played no direct role in the unlawful recording of 
the conversation at issue; that there was no allegation that the radio 
station broke the law in obtaining the recording; and that the content of 
the recording was a matter of public concern.52 Citing Branzburg, he 
emphasized that “[o]ur holding, of course, does not apply to punishing 
parties for obtaining the relevant information unlawfully.”53 And Justice 
Stephen Breyer’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice O’Connor, 
suggested that these factors by themselves might still not have been 
enough absent the affected speakers’ lack of a “legitimate interest in 
maintaining the privacy of the particular conversation.”54 
In short, then, Bartnicki reaffirms Justice Stewart’s view of the 
relationship between the First Amendment and the press: the Court is 
particularly sensitive about dictating the content of published 
information, including through post-publication prosecution. At the 
same time, it shows little inclination to afford any special protection to 
the antecedent acts of newsgathering—without which such reporting 
would not be possible. 
Thus, even as numerous scholars have attempted to articulate criteria 
to determine who constitutes the press, few—if any—of those 
discussions have focused on the related but distinct quandary raised by 
the autonomy concept enmeshed within the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence: “The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of 
Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act.”55 
B.  “Democratic Competence” and the Freedom of the Press 
The animating premise of Robert Post’s new book, as noted above, is 
that First Amendment jurisprudence should recognize the significance of 
“democratic competence” in addition to (and perhaps in some cases at 
the expense of) “democratic legitimation.”56 In other words, not all 
                                                     
51. Id. at 517–18. 
52. See id. at 527–35. 
53. Id. at 532 n.19 (emphasis added) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691). 
54. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis removed). 
55. Stewart, supra note 42, at 636. 
56. See POST, supra note 13, at 96. 
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speech is equal. This conclusion is deeply embedded within the Court’s 
jurisprudence with regard to misleading or defamatory speech, but 
largely missing from discussions of scientific opinion, academic 
freedom, or other closely related topics.57 In an age where every 
controversial issue is often framed as just another debate with two sides, 
Post’s book attempts to provide a constitutional roadmap for privileging 
speech qua opinion that is the unique result of professional expertise.58 
This could be accomplished, Post posits, by extending First Amendment 
coverage to governmental regulation of “disciplinary speech”59—
anything from laws compelling doctors to provide certain information to 
pregnant women contemplating abortion to laws barring lawyers from 
encouraging their clients to incur debt “in contemplation of 
bankruptcy.”60 Post concedes that under his approach, some disciplines 
will be more susceptible to governmental interference than others.61 In 
particular, “[t]he more divided the community of disciplinary expertise, 
the greater the leeway for political control.”62 But where the community 
of disciplinary expertise stands together, the First Amendment, in Post’s 
view, should provide a potent and ubiquitous counterbalance to 
governmental attempts to suppress that expert opinion, or in the 
alternative to require “equal time” for contrary views.63 
What this means in practice, Post explains, is that “democratic 
competence can be constitutionally protected only if the disciplinary 
practices that create expert knowledge are themselves invested with 
constitutional status.”64 That is to say, the First Amendment should not 
only protect the opinion that professional expertise produces; it should 
also protect the means that that profession uses to arrive at the opinion.65 
Although Post does not offer an exhaustive list of which professions 
should or should not be included, he specifically notes that “[t]he 
practices of astrology and palmistry would not qualify, but those of 
chemistry, law, and medicine probably would.”66 More generally, the 
First Amendment should cover practices “regarded as contributing to the 
                                                     
57. See, e.g., id. at 41–44. 
58. See id. at 96. 
59. Id. at 44. 
60. See id. at 48–52. 
61. See id. at 97. 
62. Id. at 97. 
63. See id. at 97–98. 
64. Id. at 96. 
65. See id. at 96–97. 
66. Id. at 96. 
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value of democratic competence” and, where necessary, shield such 
practices from all but the most compelling governmental intrusions.67 
So conceived, it is relatively easy to envision journalism as one of the 
disciplines whose practices should receive First Amendment coverage 
within Post’s framework. After all, journalism makes a substantial 
contribution to the value of democratic competence; in many respects, 
there may be no field that more directly advances “the cognitive 
empowerment of persons within public discourse.”68 
More subtly, journalism also fits within the jurisprudential pattern that 
Post’s book laments. That is to say, journalism is another example 
wherein the U.S. Supreme Court at various points appreciates the 
constitutional significance of the product resulting from disciplinary 
expertise, but shows little inclination to show special favor for the means 
pursuant to which the discipline arrived at those ends. And, as Post 
suspects is true more generally, the particular concern with regard to 
journalism may be a fear of privileging elites at the expense of valuable 
but amateur opinion.69 All the while, such an approach may well 
privilege those who determine who the elites actually are for First 
Amendment purposes.70 
Finally, journalism appears to be a qualifying discipline because it 
bears all the hallmarks of the other disciplines Post would be inclined to 
include: First, there are professional standards and ethical norms of 
conduct to which journalists generally aspire.71 A professional 
accrediting organization (the Accrediting Council on Education in 
Journalism and Mass Communications) supervises undergraduate and 
graduate programs.72 Additionally, whether or not courts have already 
identified such standards,73 it is possible, however controversially, to 
                                                     
67. See id. 
68. See id. at 33–37. 
69. See, e.g., id. at 56–60 (explaining how courts would decide whether—and when—to protect 
the “circulation of expert knowledge”). 
70. See, e.g., id. at xi–xiii. 
71. See Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISTS (1996), 
http://www.spj.org/pdf/ethicscode.pdf. 
72. See ACEJMC Accredited Programs 2011–2012, ACCREDITING COUNCIL ON EDUC. 
JOURNALISM & MASS COMMC’NS (MAY 15, 2012), 
http://www2.ku.edu/~acejmc/STUDENT/PROGLIST.SHTML. 
73. See Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan’s Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of 
Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7 (1994) (articulating a series of norms that have emerged in libel law 
in cases applying the “actual malice” test from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964), including norms regarding appropriate amounts of research and independent source 
verification; use of language, especially in articles about criminal activity, that implies conclusions 
unsupported by available facts; and so on). 
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identify judicially manageable norms of journalism that would allow 
courts to differentiate between those who qualify as practitioners in the 
field and those who do not.74 
C.  Implications: From Branzburg to WikiLeaks 
Indeed, the more interesting question appears to be not whether 
journalism would fit within Post’s paradigm, but what, exactly, that 
might entail. There are two immediate possibilities: 
First, the case for a constitutionally grounded “reporter’s privilege” 
might become far stronger under a democratic competence approach 
insofar as newsgathering might become a disciplinary practice invested 
with its own constitutional protections. After all, part of the Court’s 
concern in Branzburg was whether reporters should be treated no 
differently from average citizens in terms of the “normal duty of 
appearing and furnishing information relevant to the grand jury’s task.”75 
If the professional discipline of newsgathering were invested with First 
Amendment coverage, that would provide a potentially compelling 
distinction between the reporter and the citizen. In that case, the reporter 
could at least claim that protecting the confidentiality of a source was a 
necessary concomitant to gathering news. To be sure, courts would have 
to scrutinize such a claim with care, but Post’s approach differentiates 
between First Amendment coverage and First Amendment protection—
only the former follows from an approach grounded in democratic 
competence.76 What First Amendment standards actually govern such 
disciplinary practices is a question of First Amendment protection that 
could only be answered in time. 
Still, it seems safe to speculate that such an approach would not 
produce an absolute reporter’s privilege; rather, it would yield a 
qualified privilege along the lines of Justice Powell’s Branzburg 
concurrence—a case-by-case analysis in which the reporter is able to 
protect the anonymity of a source in all but the most compelling 
circumstances.77 Of course, a number of courts have already recognized 
such a privilege through creatively counting the votes in Branzburg.78 
                                                     
74. See West, supra note 26. 
75. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972). 
76. POST, supra note 13, at 96. 
77. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). 
78. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 306–07 (2d Cir. 2011); Price v. Time, 
Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 
721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980)); Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 59–60 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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Post’s democratic competence approach would provide the missing (or, 
at least, undertheorized) constitutional underpinnings for such a 
maneuver—and for Powell’s underlying argument. 
Second, recognizing journalism as a professional discipline with 
constitutionally protected means of generating disciplinary knowledge 
would also provide the constitutional underpinnings for distinguishing 
between those who are practitioners of the discipline and those who are 
not. Indeed, it is axiomatic under Post’s approach that courts would 
inevitably generate a “constitutional sociology of knowledge”79—a 
functional approach that would accord protected status to the means by 
which professional journalism is produced. Thus, anyone who followed 
those professional practices—whether professional journalists or 
amateurs—would presumably be entitled to invoke whatever special 
privileges follow from recognizing journalism as such a discipline. At 
the same time, those who do not comply with such practices could not in 
turn resort to special constitutional protection for their activities or the 
fruits thereof. 
By this logic, it follows that the staff of the New York Times would 
qualify for special protections, whereas Julian Assange and his 
colleagues at WikiLeaks arguably would have a harder (but hardly 
impossible) time claiming such protections.80 Explaining how the Times 
handled the WikiLeaks material, Managing Editor Bill Keller wrote that 
“[y]our obligation, as an independent news organization, is to verify the 
material, to supply context, to exercise responsible judgment about what 
to publish and what not to publish and to make sense of it.”81 In this 
respect, at least, Post’s democratic competence framework appears only 
to expand the scope of the First Amendment. After all, even if only a 
subset of the public is entitled to claim special protections for the 
disciplinary practices that result in professional journalism, that goes 
only to the Court’s historic reluctance to accord protection to 
newsgathering. Nothing about such a result at least immediately suggests 
that the Court might simultaneously be inclined to scale back the 
protections it has historically accorded to the content (and act) of 
publication. 
                                                     
79. POST, supra note 13, at 96. 
80. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 28 (noting the differences between the approach taken by 
reporters at the New York Times and that followed by WikiLeaks, including WikiLeaks’ initial 
public disclosure of thousands of documents without any “harm minimization”). 
81. Id. 
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II.  DEMOCRATIC COMPETENCE WOULD ALSO 
POTENTIALLY EMPOWER EXPERTISE-DRIVEN 
ARGUMENTS FOR PRESERVING NATIONAL SECURITY 
SECRETS 
Another arena in which the democratic competence approach might 
also further empower the press is with respect to publishing sensitive 
governmental—or even private—information. After all, if professional 
journalism standards of newsgathering are met, Post’s methodology 
suggests that the First Amendment would to some degree shield 
professional journalists’ decisions to gather—and then publish—
information that might otherwise be properly kept out of the public 
domain. Consider Bill Keller’s analysis of the Times’ WikiLeaks 
coverage: 
We have written a series of articles based on what we have 
learned about various aspects of American foreign policy from 
this trove of secret cables. We have drawn on our past reporting 
and the experience of our correspondents to supply context and 
to cast doubt where information in the cables is 
questionable. . . . We have edited out any information that could 
identify confidential sources—including informants, dissidents, 
academics and human rights activists—or otherwise 
compromise national security.82 
In other words, the Times’ decision to publish the cables reflected its 
professional journalistic judgment, and not just a knee-jerk reaction to 
having a big story thrust into its lap.83 Similar arguments were made 
when the Times and the Washington Post broke the torture memos, the 
warrantless wiretapping program, the existence of black site detention 
facilities, and so on.84 The media organizations that decide to publish 
classified national security information tend to invoke two different 
justifications for their conduct: First, they argue that the disclosed 
material is newsworthy insofar as it touches on matters of public 
concern. Second, and related, they argue that much of the classified 
material should not have been classified, either because it does not in 
fact relate to national security or because the underlying program to 
                                                     
82. Bill Keller, Answers to Readers’ Questions About State’s Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29askthetimes.html; see also id. (“The 
government, of course, has the right—under law, and as a matter of common sense—to keep some 
information secret. When the government fails to do so, as it did in this case owing to a security 
breach that has reportedly been corrected, then we have to decide what to do with the fallout.”). 
83. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 28. 
84. See sources cited supra notes 30–32. 
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which the material relates is illegal.85 For support, these arguments often 
emphasize that, under the terms of the relevant Executive Order, national 
security information should not be classified to “conceal violations of 
law, inefficiency, or administrative error,” or “prevent embarrassment to 
a person, organization, or agency.”86 What this strand of reasoning 
misses, though, is that information that is otherwise properly classified 
(pursuant to any one of seven broadly defined categories in the most 
recent Executive Order)87 is not subject to declassification merely 
because it conceals violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative 
error. Instead, the Executive Order imposes a de facto intent 
requirement; so long as the intent of classification is not to conceal 
illegality, the classification is not improper under § 1.7(a) even if the 
subject of the classified material is unlawful governmental conduct.88 
This distinction is important because, to the extent that a journalist’s 
decision to disclose sensitive national security information may reflect 
two judgments, it is important to highlight the extent to which only one 
of those judgments is arguably at the core of the journalist’s 
“disciplinary expertise.” That is, while the decision that particular 
classified material is newsworthy is fairly seen as one in which a 
journalist’s professional judgment should figure prominently, it is far 
more difficult to make the same argument about a decision that 
particular information would jeopardize national security if disclosed to 
the public. To the contrary, the government routinely argues (and courts 
routinely agree) that the relevant expertise in this field belongs largely, if 
not exclusively, to the Executive Branch.89 As Justice Blackmun wrote 
                                                     
85. See generally Note, Media Incentives and National Security Secrets, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2228 
(2009). 
86. Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7(a), 75 FED. REG. 707, 710 (Dec. 29, 2009). 
87. Id. § 1.4, 75 FED. REG. at 709 (mandating that classified information pertain to “(a) military 
plans, weapons systems, or operations; (b) foreign government information; (c) intelligence 
activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology; (d) foreign 
relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources; (e) scientific, 
technological, or economic matters relating to the national security; (f) United States Government 
programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; (g) vulnerabilities or capabilities of 
systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national 
security; or (h) the development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction”). 
88. This conclusion follows from the text of the Executive Order, which only forbids 
classification if it was “in order to” serve one of the four prohibited goals. See id. § 1.7(a), 75 FED. 
REG. at 709. 
89. See, e.g., McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (acknowledging and 
deferring to “the CIA’s technical expertise and practical familiarity with the ramifications of 
sensitive information”). 
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for the Court in Department of the Navy v. Egan,90 
Predictive judgment of this kind must be made by those with the 
necessary expertise in protecting classified information. For 
“reasons . . . too obvious to call for enlarged discussion,” the 
protection of classified information must be committed to the 
broad discretion of the agency responsible, and this must include 
broad discretion to determine who may have access to it. 
Certainly, it is not reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert 
body to review the substance of such a judgment and to decide 
whether the agency should have been able to make the necessary 
affirmative prediction with confidence. Nor can such a body 
determine what constitutes an acceptable margin of error in 
assessing the potential risk.91 
This point should not be overstated. Nevertheless, it seems likely that, 
faced with conflicting claims to “disciplinary expertise”—the reporter’s 
claim that particular information is newsworthy and the government’s 
claim that the same information would endanger national security if 
publicly disclosed—courts will inevitably place a heavy thumb on the 
scale in favor of the government. As Chief Justice Roberts suggested 
two years ago, “when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing 
factual inferences in [cases implicating national security and foreign 
policy concerns], the lack of competence on the part of the courts is 
marked, and respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate.”92 
Of course, as such reasoning indicates, this argument is central even 
under existing frameworks for conceptualizing the relationship between 
the First Amendment and national security. But to whatever extent a 
democratic competence approach would extend the scope of First 
Amendment coverage to the disciplinary practices by which we 
construct expert knowledge, there is no reason why the argument would 
not work equally well in reverse. Indeed, cases where the media seeks to 
disclose national security secrets and the government refuses based on 
claims of unique institutional “expertise” could cut against First 
Amendment-grounded defenses. 
If this outcome, too, is normatively desirable, it might follow that 
                                                     
90. 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
91. Id. at 529 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 170 
(1985)). 
92. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. (“One reason for that respect is that 
national security and foreign policy concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront evolving 
threats in an area where information can be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct 
difficult to assess.”). 
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democratic competence would then put the right question before the 
courts, i.e., whether the professional expertise of journalists with regard 
to newsworthiness should outweigh the government’s proffered 
expertise in assessing the risk of disclosing sensitive national security 
information to the public. But if the true contribution of democratic 
competence is to turn this—and all relatively analogous—questions into 
judicially enforced balancing tests, democratic competence will not only 
require constructing a “constitutional sociology of knowledge,”93 to 
borrow Post’s phraseology; it will also require a hierarchical 
understanding of how to privilege one such sociology over another in 
cases in which they conflict. 
Moreover, the more courts become obsessed (as they surely will) with 
questions of whether to favor one kind of expertise over another in 
sorting out the First Amendment considerations, the more likely it is that 
they will lose track of the reason for engaging in the endeavor in the first 
place—“the cognitive empowerment of persons within public 
discourse.”94 If disciplinary expertise is truly the linchpin of democratic 
competence, it is difficult to see why a (properly formed) expert belief 
that information should not be provided to persons within public 
discourse is worthy of any less constitutional enshrinement than a belief 
that such information should be. Otherwise, democratic competence 
would risk internal inconsistency, for it would suggest that disciplinary 
knowledge is only relevant to the extent it contributes material to public 
discourse, rather than to the extent that it enriches the role “experts” play 
in shaping public discourse. 
A separate but distinct objection might be that we should resist the 
idea that government expertise is the sole consideration when it comes to 
matters of national security. One need look no further for this criticism 
than Professor Alice Ristroph’s satire of the use of the “ticking bomb” 
hypothetical in debates over torture. After introducing the hypothetical, 
Ristroph deconstructs the expertise-laden assumptions on which it relies: 
The rhetorical strategy is to secure an admission that torture is 
sometimes morally justifiable. From there, it’s just a matter of 
working out the operational details, which . . . is of course a task 
for experts rather than ordinary civilians or—heaven forbid—
lawyers. Who will select the targets for torture? (Security 
experts within the executive or military.) What methods will be 
used? (Those determined by the experts to be effective.) How do 
                                                     
93. POST, supra note 13, at 96. 
94. Id. at 34. 
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we know that the experts identify the right targets, those who 
actually have critical information? (They’re experts, stupid. 
They’ll use their expertise.)95 
Yet again, though, this argument underscores a broader critique of 
democratic competence: If the goal is enriching public discourse, should 
disciplinary expertise really be the sine qua non of First Amendment 
protection? Is there not something to be said for the role of truly amateur 
contributions to public discourse, especially in circumstances in which 
the “experts” may be beholden to outmoded (and outdated) ways of 
thinking about the underlying concepts, and might otherwise be inclined 
to crowd amateurs out of the conversation? 
Ultimately, the example of national security secrets seems at once to 
illuminate both the promise and peril of democratic competence: certain 
speech that has not historically received special First Amendment 
treatment would receive it, but only when a particular subset of parties 
(as determined by the courts) engages in it. For better or worse, the 
result seems to be that the First Amendment would thereby become 
deeper in its scope, but narrower in its application. 
CONCLUSION: THE VIRTUE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DISORDER? 
This Essay opened with two roughly contemporaneous quotes cutting 
(at least superficially) in fairly different directions. Testifying before 
Congress in 1979, CIA General Counsel Tony Lapham bemoaned the 
lack of clarity concerning the Espionage Act—the uncertain scope of 
which continues to plague contemporary conversations over the extent to 
which leakers (and those who report on leaks) should face criminal 
liability for disclosing sensitive national security information.96 In 
contrast, Professor Alex Bickel, writing in The Morality of Consent in 
1975, extolled the virtue of constitutional “disorder,” on the theory that, 
as between two equally unsustainable alternatives in the long-run (the 
government has both or neither the power to withhold and censor), a 
theoretically indefensible compromise position was the best way 
practically to balance two ultimately irreconcilable values—“privacy 
and public discourse.”97 
The juxtaposition of the quotes was deliberate, but they are not 
entirely inconsistent. There is a world of difference between statutory 
disorder and constitutional disorder. Yes, our federal statutes should 
                                                     
95. Ristroph, supra note 29, at 251–52. 
96. Supra text accompanying note 1. 
97. Supra text accompanying note 2. 
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more clearly distinguish between true spies, leakers, and those who 
disseminate the products of those leaks, even if we think either or both 
of the latter should face criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures 
of national security information. Statutory ambiguity in this field at once 
both chills speech and unduly hampers government, since actors on both 
sides of the equation can never be sure whether the conduct at issue is in 
fact within the legislative sanction. 
But the more we seek to articulate constitutional rules for 
distinguishing between these categories, the more that the recipients of 
special protection in that constitutional scheme become dependent upon 
protecting their special constitutional status. Such a result would also 
almost certainly come at the expense of whatever other values contribute 
to their role in illuminating public discourse. As Floyd Abrams warned, 
“A press that continually applies to the courts for vindication of its right 
to gather information cannot credibly be the same press that tells the 
same courts that what the press prints and why it prints it are not matters 
that courts may even consider.”98 
At a higher level of abstraction, Abrams’ view is a variation on 
Justice Stewart’s theme that “autonomy cuts both ways.”99 That is to say, 
the danger in giving any category of speech special First Amendment 
protection is that it necessarily diminishes the speaker’s autonomy, since 
there is something about the speech that qualifies it for special solicitude 
within the ambit of Post’s First Amendment vision. And were the speech 
lacking that particular characteristic, it would be left on the outside. The 
real question therefore becomes whether courts should construe the First 
Amendment so that it supports “the cognitive empowerment of persons 
within public discourse,”100 or whether courts should understand the 
First Amendment as protecting the autonomy of those institutions—like 
the press—that play particularly central roles in contributing to that 
cognitive empowerment. Even if all agree that democratic competence 
should play a critical role in our thinking about the First Amendment, 
there may be numerous institutions for which we should be more careful 
to safeguard their autonomy than their internal disciplinary practices. 
 
                                                     
98. Abrams, supra note 41, at 591. 
99. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
100. POST, supra note 13, at 34 (emphasis added). 
